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Previous literature suggests that new firms established by entrepreneurs that 
previously worked in the same industry, also known as spin-offs, perform better than 
other entrants. In this study we try to explain their superior performance based on 
the learning effect theory. We suggest that the founders of spin-offs learn and 
transfer knowledge from their parent firm to their new ventures, affecting ventures 
survival and growth. In order to analyze this, we start by categorizing and measuring 
different types of knowledge accumulated by the founder while working in the parent 
firm. We focus only in market and technological knowledge. Then, we test how these 
specific knowledge attributes affect spin-offs’ performance. 
To perform our analysis, we draw on two rich datasets: matched employer-
employee database and one financial database. With these databases, we have access 
to micro-level data on firms and founders combined with firm’s financial data. As 
individuals and firms are cross referenced by a unique identifier, we can trace the 
mobility of workers across firms and their career histories. 
Our results suggest that, in the opposite of what we were expecting, only 
technological knowledge has a significant impact on spin-offs’ performance in terms 
of survival and growth, increasing their probability of surviving by 8,13% and 
increasing their growth by 10,5%. In the other hand, market knowledge has no 
significant impact on spin-off’s performance either in terms of survival or growth. 
 
JEL classification: M13, L26  
Keywords: Spin-off, Knowledge Transfer, Knowledge Accumulation, Performance, 
Survival, Growth 
 








A literatura sugere que novas empresas criadas por indivíduos que 
anteriormente trabalhavam no mesmo sector, denominadas de spin-offs, apresentam 
um desempenho superior relativamente às outras. Este estudo tem como objectivo 
explicar a elevada performance dos spin-offs com base na teoria do efeito de 
aprendizagem (learning effect theory). Na sequência dessa teoria, sugere-se que os 
fundadores de spin-offs aprendem e transferem conhecimento da sua empresa-mãe, 
que por sua vez irá afectar o seu desempenho económico em termos de sobrevivência 
no mercado e crescimento. De modo a analisar o impacto da aprendizagem e 
transferência de conhecimento nos spin-offs, começou-se por categorizar e medir 
diferentes tipos de conhecimentos acumulados pelo fundador enquanto trabalhava 
na empresa-mãe. Este estudo apenas se focou nos conhecimentos de mercado e 
conhecimentos tecnológico. De seguida, avaliou-se de que forma esses conhecimentos 
específicos afetam o desempenho dos spin-offs. 
A análise baseou-se em duas bases de dados: Quadros de Pessoal e outra base 
que comtempla dados financeiros. Utilizando ambas as bases de dados foi possível 
obter a informação que associa empresas e fundadores a dados financeiros das 
respectivas empresas. Como os indivíduos e as empresas são cruzados e identificados 
por um identificador único, foi possível analisar a mobilidade dos trabalhadores 
entre empresas e sua carreira. 
Os resultados sugerem que, ao contrário do que se estava à espera, apenas o 
conhecimento de tecnologia tem um impacto significativo no desempenho dos spin-
offs em termos de sobrevivência e crescimento, aumentando a probabilidade do spin-
off sobreviver no mercado em 8,13% e aumentanto a sua taxa de crescimento em 
10,5%. Por outro lado, o conhecimento de mercado aparentemente não tem impacto 






significativo no desempenho dos spin-offs, tanto em termos de sobrevivência como 
em termos de crescimento. 
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Two empirical facts are unequivocal in the entrepreneurial literature. 
First, the vast majority of the successful entrepreneurs were previously 
employed (Burt, 2000; Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005). Second, 
ventures established by entrepreneurs that previously worked in the same 
industry (spin-offs) perform better than other entrants (Klepper, 2001, 2007; 
Colombo, Delmastro and Girilli, 2004; Astebro and Bernhardt, 2005). 
Although several theories have been appointed to explain spin-offs 
superior performance, 1  in this paper we will focus on the most cited 
perspective, the learning effect theory. This theory suggests that resources 
such as routines and knowledge are transferred from the incumbent firm to 
the new entity (Carroll, 1984; Hannan and Freeman, 1986). While working, 
the founders learn and observe the organization structure of the incumbent 
firm, acquire the relevant knowledge on the product and technology but also 
on the markets and its key players. When starting their own firms, these 
entrepreneurs will use their accumulated knowledge and they will mirror and 
improve the models and routines that they are familiar with (Dahl and 
Reichstein, 2010). 
As suggested by previous studies, founder's knowledge endowments and 
prior experiences are thus crucial for the fate of the new venture. 
                                                          
1 Other theories include: the institutional effect (Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Ferreira, Tavares, 
Hesterley and Armagan, 2006), timing effect (Klepper, 2001; Koster, 2004) and more recently the self-
selection effect (Chatterji, 2009; Bazzazian, 2012). 






Nevertheless, it is less clear empirically what structural skills and knowledge 
are responsible for the spin-offs superior performance. While there has been 
a growing research on understanding the link between prior employer 
characteristics and spin-off success, this central question remains partially 
unanswered and therefore it will be the focus of this study. Studies have 
analyzed the size,2 the age (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Ferreira, Tavares, 
Hesterley and Armagan, 2006), the degree of prominence (Burton, Sorensen 
and Beckman, 2002) and the performance (Dahl and Reichstein, 2005, 2006, 
2010; Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar, 2004; Eriksson and Kuhn, 
2006) of the incumbent firm.  Others highlight the importance of founder 
characteristics, such as tenure3 (Dahl and Reichstein, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2010) on spin-offs superior performance. However, only technological 
knowledge and innovation has been empirically analyzed (Chatterji, 2009; 
Andersson, Baltozopoulos and Loof, 2011).  
In this paper, we empirically evaluate the roots of knowledge 
accumulation, and contribute to the learning effect theory by defining the 
exact mechanisms that underlie spin-off’s superior performance. In order to 
do so, we start by categorizing and measuring different types of knowledge 
accumulated by the founder while working in the parent firm. Then, we 
evaluate which knowledge is more likely to affect venture performance by 
taking into account several mediator factors, such as prior employer’s 
characteristics (i.e. age, size and performance) or founders’ characteristics 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Sorensen and Phillips (2004); Klepper and Sleeper (2005); Klepper and Thompson (2005); 
Klepper (2009); Ferreira et al., (2006); Parker (2009); Elfenbein, Hamilton and Zenger (2010). 
3We define tenure as the length of time the founder worked in the previous employer. 






(i.e. age, education, gender, parent industry experience, entrepreneurial 
experience and regional experience). 
To perform our analysis, we draw on two rich datasets: matched employer-
employee database (Quadros de Pessoal) and a financial database.  With these 
databases, we have access to micro-level data on firms and founders combined 
with firm’s financial data. Our data gives us detailed information not only on 
founders and their background history but also firm’s R&D investments and 
marketing expenses. As individuals and firms are cross referenced by a 
unique identifier, we can trace the mobility of workers across firms.  
Our results suggest that technological knowledge accumulated and 
transferred from the parent firm has a significant and positive impact on 
spin-offs’ performance in terms of survival and growth, increasing their 
probability of surviving by 8,13% and increasing their growth by 10,5%. In 
contrast, we can infer from our results that market knowledge has no 
significant impact on spin-off’s performance in terms of survival and growth. 
Implications of this research for policy-makers and academics are 
significant. This is important for policy makers, who wish to enhance 
entrepreneurial activity and for researchers to gain insight about the impact 
of the learning effect on performance and more specifically, to understand 
which knowledge triggers successful ventures. Several institutions, for 
example universities and other governmental agencies, may as well benefit 
from the indication of which kind of knowledge gap is important to fill to 
foster high-growth businesses. This makes conclusions with regard to the 
effects of knowledge transfers to spin-offs very relevant. 






The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. The 
following section reviews the literature on spin-offs. Then, in section III we 
exhibit our theory and hypotheses. In section IV, we describe the dataset and 
how it was constructed. The empirical methodology and results are described 

















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 







Spin-offs (or spin-outs) 4  have attracted a large attention in the 
entrepreneurial literature. They have been studied in several set of industries 
like the tire industry (Buenstorf and Klepper, 2009), medical device industry 
(Chatterji, 2009), laser industry (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), automobiles 
(Klepper, 2002), and disk drives (Agarwal et al., 2004). In these studies, spin-
offs are the most successful type of entrants outperforming de novo entrants 
and diversifying firms. They grow faster and have higher survival rates.5 In 
fact, spin-offs play an important role on job ccreation and economic growth 
but also in the development of industries (Klepper, 2002; Klepper and 
Sleeper, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2004).  
A number of theories have been advanced to explain why some employees 
exit their parent firm to start their own firm. Spin-offs either emerge due to 
technological innovations/ business opportunity (Wiggins, 1995), or due to 
employee’s frustration with the parents’ organizational inertia.6 Very often 
employee’s frustration arise because their ideas for an innovation or a new 
sub-market are rejected by the parent firm (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), or 
they simply become unhappy with their careers prospects (Eriksson and 
Kuhn, 2006). Klepper and Thompson (2006) add that spin-offs occur when 
                                                          
4 More recently, some studies have adopted the term spin-outs to distinguish between employees spin-
offs and corporate spin-offs. See for example, Agarwal et al., (2004). Also, the literature distinguishes 
between intra-industry spin-offs and inter-industry spin-offs. While intra-industry spin-offs are firms 
founded by ex-employees of parent firms in the same industry, inter-industry spin-offs are spin-offs 
established in a different industry.  In this study, we will refer to intra-industry spin-offs by simply 
spin-offs . 
5 Eriksson and Kuhn (2006); Klepper (2001, 2002); Agarwal et al. (2004); Klepper and Sleeper (2005); 
Klepper and Thompson (2006); Dahl and Reichstein (2010). 
6 See, e.g., Garvin (1983); Cooper (1985); Klepper (2001); Phillips (2002). 






disagreements between the parent firm and employees are of sufficient 
magnitude to justify the cost of forming a new firm.  
II.1 THEORIES ON SPIN-OFFS PERFORMANCE 
 
Given that spin-offs outperform other entrants, previous literature has 
devoted a considerable amount of effort in understanding the main 
determinants of such superior performance.  Among several explanations, we 
can summarize the following theories: (1) knowledge accumulation effect 
(learning effect); (2) institutional effect (Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Ferreira et 
al., 2006); (3) timing effect (Klepper, 2001; Koster, 2004); and (4) self-selection 
effect (Chatterji, 2009; Bazzazian, 2012). 
The most cited explanation is the learning effect perspective. This 
perspective argues about founders superior knowledge endowments (Agarwal 
et al., 2004; Dahl and Reichstein 2006, 2010). Founders accumulate not only 
codified knowledge, available in memos, reports or technical specifications 
but also tacit knowledge (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2004) 
generated by learning by doing (Arrow, 1962) or learning by observing 
(Nonaka, 1994) in the course of their previous employment. Also, they learn 
the routines and skills while being employed at an incumbent firm, which 
become useful for them and eventually lead to superior venture performance.7  
As evidence of the learning effect perspective, spin-offs concentrate in 
younger industries and tend to locate in close proximity to their parent firm 
                                                          
7Shane (2000); Klepper (2001); Dahl and Reichstein (2010); Dahl and Reichstein (2005); Dahl, Pederson and Palum; 
Baptista, Karaoz and Mendonça (2007). 






(Sorenson, 2003). Detailed knowledge and social connections tend to be 
immobile and unequally distributed across geographical space (Dahl, 
Pederson and Palum), therefore locating near the parent firm facilitates the 
knowledge transfer to the founder. Moreover, in younger industries, 
knowledge is more likely to be embodied in human rather than physical 
capital (Garvin, 1983). 
 Thus far, the focus of the previous studies on learning effects has been in 
the transfer of industry specific knowledge, they have identified several 
knowledges but none of the studies have tested empirically their effects.8 
Previous literatures suggest that spin-offs are more successful than other 
entrants because they take advantage of various industry specific knowledge 
that founders acquire while being employed at their parents.9 Since spin-offs’ 
resources are directly related to the focal industry of their parents (Agarwal 
et al., 2004), these ventures have superior capabilities to mobilize and use 
their resources (Koster, 2004). Several industry specific knowledge are 
transferred to the new entity, for example: personal networks (Eriksson and 
Kuhn, 2006) and market knowledge (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Agarwal et 
al., 2004). The latter includes marketing knowledge on distribution channels, 
marketing techniques and expertise, and customer demand (Uzunca, 2011), 
as well knowledge about suppliers and competitors (Helfat and Lieberman, 
2002).  
                                                          
8 Except Andersson et al., (2011), that have empirically analyzed technological and innovation 
knowledge. 
9 See, e.g., Klepper (2001); Helfat and Lieberman (2002); Koster and Wissen (2003); Klepper and 
Sleeper (2005); Dahl and Reichstein (2005); Balconi and Fontana (2011); Bazzazian (2012). 






Knowledge on R&D strategies, innovation, products (Klepper and Sleeper, 
2005) and technologies (e.g. knowledge on production processes and business 
processes) (Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009; Andersson et al., 2011) also 
appear to be transferred to the new entries. Particularly, innovative parents 
firms (with significant investments in R&D), tend to stimulate entrepreneurs 
of higher quality and spun off ventures with longer survival prospects 
(Klepper 2001; Andersson et al., 2011). Balconi and Fontana (2011) adds that 
spin-offs from innovative parents are more likely to innovate as well.  
Parents’ organizational routines, blueprints, strategies and organizational 
forms can also be transferred to the new firms.10 In fact, spin-offs maintain a 
close contact and informal ties with their parent firms. This allows spin-offs 
to acquire resources, creating an advantageous position over the other start-
ups (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). These informal relations happen, for 
example, through daily telephone calls, visits to old colleagues and common 
activities among firms (Uzunca 2011).  Consequently, spin-offs usually 
resemble very closely their parents firms. 
Some studies even go further by comparing spin-offs to parasites, that feed 
from the innovations and knowledge of their parents (Klepper and Sleeper, 
2005; Klepper and Thompson, 2006). In contrast, others see spin-offs as the 
engine of innovation, compensating for the incumbents inertia (Klepper and 
Thompson 2006; Ferreira et al., 2006). A third view suggests that spin-offs 
differentiate themselves from their parents, by adopting and improving 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Klepper (2001, 2002); Carroll et al. (1996); Helfat and Lieberman (2002); Phillips (2002); 
Aldrich and Wiedenmayer (1993). 






parent’s routines. Thus, they do not copy but simply adapt and reform 
routines based on their experience (Dahl and Reichstein, 2006). To sum up, 
the learning effect theory suggests that spin-offs superior performance is due 
to the transfer of knowledge (in innovation/technological, marketing and 
organizational) from the parent firm to the new entity.   
Alternatively, the institutional theory suggests that parent firm provides 
not knowledge but social intangible resources, such as reputation and 
legitimacy (Higgins and Gulati, 2003) as well as credibility, which in the end 
affect venture performance. The parent firm signals the quality of the new 
venture, leading the market to extrapolate the same qualities and capabilities 
from the parent to the spin-off (Ferreira et al., 2006). 
A third theory suggests that spin-offs’ superior performance is due to a 
better time management, either due to an early mover advantage (Klepper, 
2001) or a longer maturing phase (Koster, 2004) to evaluate the decision to 
enter into the market. As founders are still employed in the set-up period, 
spin-offs will only come to life when the idea is profitable and well matured 
(Koster, 2004). 
More recently, studies have been arguing that spin-offs success does not 
result from an inheritance process but from a self-selection mechanism where 
the more talented and endowed employers with higher innate abilities choose 
to leave their previous employer to start they own business (Chatterji, 2009). 
The best and brightest employees of the incumbent firms are systematically 
selected into spin-offs and as a result the performance of their new venture 
will be correlated with their innate abilities (Bazzazian, 2012). 







II.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON SPIN-OFFS PERFORMANCE 
 
Closely related to the learning perspective theory presented above, a 
growing stream of the literature investigates empirically and or analytically 
the effects of parent firm characteristics (e.g. age, size, prominence11 and 
performance) and founder characteristics (e.g. educational background and 
tenure) on spin-offs performance. These characteristics function as mediator 
factors on the process of knowledge accumulation.   
Entrepreneurs with longer tenure (and hence with longer experience) are 
better endowed to adapt, improve and reflect the knowledge gained in the 
parent company (Dahl and Reichstein, 2005; 2006; 2007; 2010). Also, highly 
educated founders with diverse experiences have the required “absorptive 
capacity” to understand and produce more technical knowledge (Balconi and 
Fontana, 2011).12  
Older, better performing and prominent parent firms facilitate the 
knowledge accumulation process. In fact, older firms generate greater 
knowledge (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) and have higher network benefits and 
higher social capital advantages (i.e. reputation, legitimacy, and status) 
(Ferreira et al., 2006) that the potential founders can draw on. On the other 
hand, founders from prominent firms have both information and reputation 
advantages and easier access to resources. The degree of prominence of 
                                                          
11 Prominence is the number of spin-offs generated by parent firm through employee departures, also 
known as, the spin-off rate. 
12 According to Burton, Sorensen and Beckman (2002), the main source of venture quality lies in the 
prior accomplishments of the founders, particularly their career history, experiences and skills. 






parent firms also positively affects the quality of innovation of the new firms 
(Burton et al., 2002). Additionally, spin-offs from surviving parents perform 
remarkably better than other entrants (Dahl and Reichstein, 2005, 2006). 
Smarter parents are likely to give birth to smarter progenitors (Agarwal et 
al., 2004) and healthy parents generate spin-offs with longer growth and 
survival prospects (Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006).  
Another characteristic widely study in the literature is the parents size. 
Some authors argue that larger firms have the capacity to introduce greater 
knowledge (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper and Thompson, 2005; 
Klepper, 2009), generate more unused ideas that spin-offs can exploit,13 and 
have a more extensive networks (Ferreira et al., 2006). However, the majority 
of the studies argue that smaller firms allow potential entrepreneurs to be 
more generalists, acquire more heterogeneous information and have easier 
access to valuable resources and contacts outside the firm14 (Gompers et al., 
2005; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005). The division of labor in small firms is less 
formalized, which allows potential entrepreneurs to obtain diverse set of 
skills on a variety of activities (Parker, 2009; Elfenbein et al., 2010).  
 
In the next section, we will present our theory and hypotheses exploring 
the importance of resources and, more particularly, the importance of 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., Henderson (1993); Klepper (2001); Gompers et al. (2005); Audretsch et al. (2006). 
14 As Garicano and Hubbard (2003) argue, division of labor in firms becomes more definite with firm 
size. In small firms, in which the division of labor is less formal, employees normally execute less 
specialized tasks than large firms, where employees are mainly concerned with one specialized task 
hindering entrepreneurs from gaining an overview of the whole production process (Koster, 2004; 
Tsuchiya, 2006; Parker, 2009). 






knowledge in the performance and success of new entries and, therefore, in 
spin-offs. We will also discuss the process of knowledge transfer/learning as 
well the importance of some of the different kinds of knowledge in firm’s 


















III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 






New entrants arrive to the market with initial resources that derived from 
their historical antecedents. According to the resource based view, firm 
resources include assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
attributes, information, and knowledge. Basically, firm resources can be seen 
as the strengths that firms can use to conceive and implement their strategies 
that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991). More formally, 
they can be separated into tangible and intangible resources: physical assets 
such as capital, buildings and codified knowledge are tangible resources; 
organizational routines, human resources and tacit knowledge are examples 
of intangible resources (Koster, 2004). 
Followers of the resource based view generally agree that the most 
strategically important resource is knowledge/intangible assets (Osterloh and 
Frey 2000). Entrants bring with them resources and, more specifically, 
knowledge and skills embodied in their founders and gained at the parent 
firm that are likely to influence the firm’s performance and success in the long 
run (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002).  
The process by which new firms, and more specifically spin-offs, bring with 
them knowledge gained at the parent firm involves two mechanisms: learning 
at the parent firm and/or transfer knowledge from the parent firm. According 
to Huber (1991), learning is defined as the acquisition of any knowledge about 
the industry in which a firm intends to compete, that is, firm specific 
knowledge acquired by the founder while working at their parent firms. When 
ex-employees founders use this specific knowledge in their new ventures, 
resources of the parent firm are unintentionally shared with the newly 






developed firm (Koster, 2004). In contrast, knowledge transfer is a process 
which consists of exchanging, receiving, and using external knowledge (Van 
Wijk, Jansen, and Lyles, 2008). It manifests itself through changes in the 
knowledge or performance of the recipient units (that is, the organization that 
receives the external knowledge). Thus, knowledge transfer can be measured 
by measuring changes in knowledge or changes in performance (Argote and 
Ingram, 2000). According to McGrath and Argote (2001), knowledge is 
embedded in the three basic elements of organizations — members (the 
human components of organizations), tools (the technological component, 
including both hardware and software), and tasks (that reflect the 
organization’s goals, intentions, and purposes) — and the various sub-
networks formed by combining or crossing the basic elements. As the greater 
the similarity between pre-entry firm resources and the required resources in 
an industry, the greater the likelihood that the firm will survive and prosper 
(Helfat and Lieberman, 2002), we argue that the more similar the number of 
elements across the tasks between organizations, the greater the likelihood 
of the transfer (Thorndike, 1906).  
The speed and quality of the knowledge transfer/learning is determined 
by the ability to communicate and share the knowledge or skill (Argote, 
Ingram and Moreland, 2000), the strength of the tie (Hansen, 1999), the 
motivation of the agent of the transfer15 (Osterloh and Frey, 2000), the pre-
                                                          
15  Employees are motivated intrinsically (if an activity is undertaken for one’s immediate need 
satisfaction, that is, if the work content itself all compensation) as well as extrinsically (if they are able 
to satisfy their needs indirectly, especially through monetary compensation). Intrinsic motivation is 
crucial when tacit knowledge between organizations must be transferred and enables the transfer of 
tacit knowledge under conditions in which extrinsic motivation fails (Osterloh and Frey, 2000).  






entry experience of the founder (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zander and 
Kogut, 1995) and the type of knowledge to transfer. Strong ties between the 
parent and spin-off facilitate communication promoting knowledge 
acquisition, particularly when knowledge is not codified (Hansen, 1999). In 
fact, the more easily a specific knowledge or skill can be communicated and 
shared, the shorter the times to transfer (Argote, Ingram and Moreland, 
2000). According to Zander and Kogut (1995), the accumulation of experience 
in a sector or activity facilitates the communication process and the 
understanding of the relevant knowledge. This ease, in turn, should reduce 
the cost of acquiring related capabilities and speed the time to transfer. So, 
skills are more quickly transferred the more they share elements with already 
acquired knowledge. Also, the critical knowledge that allows a firm to 
function is tacit that is acquired largely through employees experience in the 
course of their previous employment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Finally, 
the speed of knowledge transfer differs according to the type of knowledge. 
While codified knowledge is possible to store in a mechanical or technological 
way, like in handbooks or information systems, a firm’s tacit knowledge is 
mostly stored only in human beings (Haldin-Herrgard, 2000), as well 
embedded in firm’s routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, codified 
knowledge is more easily transferable and more easily to assimilate than tacit 
knowledge (Argote and Ingram, 2000). Nevertheless, the role of tacit 
knowledge is essential as organizational core competency requires this 
knowledge to put in practice the codified knowledge (Haldin-Herrgard, 2000).  






Various kinds of knowledge can be learned or transferred from parent 
firms to spin-offs.  
Klepper and Sleeper (2005), Agarwal et al. (2004), Franco and Filson 
(2006) and Chatterji (2009) suggest that spin-off firms acquire valuable 
technological and market related knowledge from their incumbent firms. 
Employees accumulate technical knowledge like for example knowledge 
about the products and the production process that can be used as input for a 
new firm (Koster, 2004). Technological knowledge can be defined as those 
knowledge that mediate between inputs and outputs (process technology) 
and/or that create new products or services (product technology) (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986).  This kind of knowledge is essential for a firm in the 
sense that it forms the bases of innovation reflecting firm’s ability to generate 
new scientific discoveries and technological breakthroughs (Agarwal et al., 
2004). So, it is expected that a firm's probability of surviving is increasing in 
its technological know-how (Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco and Filson, 2006). 
The more technical knowhow the firm has, the longer it will survive. 
Therefore, this kind of knowledge is essential for new ventures performance: 
 H1: The acquisition and the transfer of technological knowledge from the 
parent firm increase the performance of spin-offs. 
 
Employees also accumulate market-related knowledge (e.g. customer 
needs, distribution methods and channels, selling methods, marketing 
practices, network of suppliers, commercialization of a product, operation of 
the market, etc.), which  is essential in daily operation of a business 






(Bazzazian, 2012). Marketing relatedness manifests itself, for example, (i) 
when a high percentage of an entrant’s initial sales come from existing 
channel customers or end customers of the parent firm (Biggadike, 1976) or 
(ii) when the entrant benefits from existing parent firms programs and 
famous brand names (Biggadike, 1976). Besides enabling firms to fulfill 
better sales figures through the application of better marketing strategies, 
this kind of knowledge also forms the bases of marketing-based 
differentiation indicating whether a firm can commercialize technological 
innovations before competitors do (Agarwal et al., 2004). If founders of spin-
offs inherit this kind of knowledge, it is expected that they are more familiar 
with the marketing skills needed to compete in the entered market and hence, 
more capable to survive and growth compared to other entrants. Therefore, 
we expect that: 
H2: The acquisition and the transfer of market knowledge from the parent 
firm increase the performance of spin-offs. 
 
Technological and market knowledge are both important for the success of 
a new venture. It will be a poor plan of entry if a firm either misses technical 
knowledge or marketing knowledge on how to design, price, service, and sell 
the products (Biggadike, 1976). Nevertheless, it is important to clarify which 
of these two kinds of knowledge (technological and market knowledge) have 
more impact on the performance of spin-offs. Chatterji (2009) finds little 
evidence that technical knowledge gained at the parent firm affects the 
superior performance of new spawns in the medical device sector. Instead, he 






argues that nontechnical types of knowledge acquired at the parent firm help 
spawns in the regulatory process, marketing to physicians, and identifying 
profitable market opportunities to pursue leading in this way to a spawns’ 
superior performance. Also, Bazzazian (2012) suggest that knowledge related 
with marketing and commercialization of a product is more important for 
success than technological knowledge. In fact, he suggests that new firms 
have higher demands for commercial and market oriented activities than for 
more technical and R&D related activities.  
Technological knowledge allows firms to create new products or services, 
and to generate new scientific discoveries and technological breakthroughs. 
Therefore, this knowledge is more likely to be tacit and hence more difficult 
to transfer. In the other hand, marketing knowledge is mainly held in the 
form of codified knowledge available in strategy reports, being more easily 
and faster to transfer and assimilate than technological knowledge. So, in the 
short-run, market knowledge is more accessible and easier to learn than 
technological knowledge. In addition, if market knowledge is more accessible 
in the short-run than technological knowledge, we can argue that this kind of 
knowledge will have a higher impact on the entry strategy of the new venture 
as well in their development in their first years.  
Although it is important that spin-offs acquire/ learn technological 
knowledge from the parent firm, it is even more important that they use this 
kind of knowledge in order to differentiate themselves from the parent firm 
(Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) by innovating. Most innovations introduced by 
spin-offs are considered to be incremental at the beginning. An incremental 






innovation is defined as a product or service attempting to serve customers 
needs already being served by existing products but with a new technology or 
method (Biggadike, 1976). Entrants with an incremental innovation face the 
tasks of developing the manufacturing processes for their product and 
attaining an acceptable level of product performance.16 According Biggadike 
(1976), it takes longer to establish a new business based on an incremental 
innovation but the performance of such a business is better in the long-run. 
Thus, an incremental innovation allows spin-offs to build a better business in 
the long-run and, in this sense, to have a better long-term performance. As 
we mentioned before, technological knowledge forms the bases of innovation 
of a firm but has lower impact in short-term performance relatively to market 
knowledge. Nevertheless, its contribution to firms’ long-term performance is 
vital. Therefore, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H3: In the short-term, market knowledge has more impact on spin-offs 
performance than technological knowledge. 
In the next section, we will describe data that it will be use to test these 
hypotheses. 
  
                                                          
16 In contrast, entrants with a similar offering can learn from existing processes or, even better, buy 
fully developed equipment and inputs from experienced suppliers (Biggadike, 1976). 






IV. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
We combine two rich datasets: a matched employer-employee database, 
‘Quadros de Pessoal’ (QP) and SCIE (Simplified Corporate Information). 
The matched employer–employee dataset is a mandatory survey 
submitted annually to the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security by firms with at least one employee. The dataset collects information 
on an average of 207,000 firms and two million individuals per year, covering 
virtually all employees and firms in the Portuguese private sector from 1986 
to 2009.  As individuals and firms are cross referenced by a unique identifier, 
the database makes it possible to identify spin-offs and trace the mobility of 
entrepreneurs across firms and match founders with their ventures’ 
characteristics.  The database has complete information at the individual and 
firm level. At the firm level, the following data are available: year of creation, 
location, size, 4 digit-code industry and number of establishments. At the 
individual level, the database contains the following information: gender, age, 
education and occupation. 
The main drawback of the previous database is its lack of financial 
information. To overcome this limitation, we use SCIE database. SCIE is a 
mandatory survey that collects year-end data on approximately 655 
accounting variables, giving us detailed information on the performance and 
costs of the parent firms and spin-offs. The SCIE was introduced in 2005 to 
substitute IHE and to assure the reporting obligations of firms to different 
entities (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Statistics Portugal (INE), 






and Portugal Central Bank). From these databases we retrieve information 
on R&D investments and marketing expenses and other financial information 
from the parent firms and start-ups. An exact match between both financial 
datasets (IHE and SCIE) with QP was provided by INE. 
From the QP data, we select all start-ups established in 2007. Then, for 
each start-up, we identify their founder and their background history. We 
exclude start-ups for which we could not identify at least one owner or the 
background history of the founder.17 Also, we restrict the sample to founders 
with age between 20 and 60. One explanation for this is that individuals with 
more than 60 years old have the motivation to start a new firm only for 
spending the time occupied. In the other hand, individuals with less than 20 
years old are too young to have long career histories. For those individuals, 
we only identify the last parent firm where the founder previously worked. 
Then, we track the parent firm performance, marketing expenses and R&D 
expenses for the last year (2006).  
In total we end up with 10086 new firms in which 2193 are spin-offs. We 
define spin-offs as a new venture established in the same four-digit industry 
as the last parent firm. This sample allows us to study the impact of the 
accumulation and transfer of knowledge from the parent firm to start-ups, 
and more specifically to spin-offs. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of 
                                                          
17 For the employees, the data include some cases in which the record changes in gender and year of 
birth. 
We consider observations with multiple changes in the gender or year of birth to be errors, 
corresponding to individuals whose identification number was not recorded, or wrongly identified by 
the respondent. We drop individuals whose gender and year birth change in more than 70 percent of 
the total number of observations. 






the data. In general, start-ups are small and employ approximately on 
average three employees. After the first three years, approximately 2385 
firms fail (in which 437 were spin-offs), corresponding to a mortality rate of 
24 percent. Approximately 43% of the startups of our sample tend to locate in 
the same region as the parent firm contrasting with the percentage of 71% in 
the case of spin-offs. Founders in our data are typically men (66%), with low 
education and with ages between 30 and 39 years old.  On average, 63% of 
our founders have founded a new firm in a given year previous to 2007. 
Parent firms in our data are in general older (on average have 15 years 
old) and larger (on average have 209 employees). Approximately 81% of all 
parent firms of our sample are more successful firms than the average firm 
in the same region and industry. Table 2 presents a short description of each 
variable and how they were constructed and Table 3 reports correlations for 











V. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
 
Survival 
In this section, we present the estimates for the effect of market and 
technological knowledge on start-ups’ performance and, more specifically, on 
spin-offs’ performance. We start by evaluating the effect of knowledge on spin-
off’ survival, by using the following equation: 
Yfsm =  ∑ αc
297
c=1
+ ∑ γi 
52
i=1
+ β1 R&𝐷m +  β2MKTm + δ1Xs + δ2 Zf + δ3Tm + εfsmci    (1) 
where f denotes founder, s denotes start-up firm, m denotes last parent firm, 
i denotes the start-up industry and c is the start-up county.  
Our dependent variable Yfsm is a dummy variable equaling one if the start-
up is still operating after 3 years (from 2007 to 2009), and 0 otherwise.  In 
this regression, αc controls for county fixed effects and γi are the two-digit 
industry fixed effects for 52 categories.  
R&𝐷m and MKTm are our variables of interest and represent, respectively, 
technological and market knowledge. Our variable of interest, R&𝐷m , 
Technological Knowledge is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a given parent 
firm has, in 2006, a higher  percentage of employees assigned to R&D than 
the average firm in the same industry, region and year, and 0 otherwise.18 
Our second variable of interest, MKTm, Market Knowledge is also a dummy 
                                                          
18 We also have tried to compute our results with an alternative variable for technological knowledge. 
However, the results were not what we were expecting and for this reason we present the results in 
Appendix A.1.  






variable that equals 1 if a given parent firm invested more in marketing 
expenses in 2006 than the average firm in the same industry, region, and year 
and 0 otherwise. Marketing expenses is computed as total expenses in 
advertising, promotions and expenditures on sales divided by sales. We divide 
by sales to exclude the effect of firm size.  
The variable Xs denotes the logarithm size of start-ups, measured as the 
logarithm of the total number of individuals in the employee records in the 
foundation year (2007). 
We include also the following vector variables: founder characteristics Zf 
and parent firm characteristics Tm . The founder characteristics vector 
includes: four indicator variables for the founder's age, partitioned at 20, 30, 
40, and 50; a gender variable, which equals 1 for men, 0 for women; an 
“industry experience” (Pindex) variable which equals 1 for founders that 
previously work (in last parent firm) on the same four-digit industry digit 
code (meaning that the founder is a spin-off founder), and 0 otherwise; an 
education variable, which is taken to be “very low” for those never completing 
elementary school, “low” for those that attended junior high school, “medium” 
for those with a high school diploma or equivalent, and “high” for those 
reporting bachelor's degree or more advanced degree; an “entrepreneurial 
experience” variable that equals 1 if a founder have created a spin-off in a 
given year previous to 2007, and 0 if not; and a “regional experience” variable 
indicating if the start-up locates near to the parent firm and, in this sense, 
indicating if the founder has some regional experience or not. This variable 






equals 1 for start-ups which locates on the same municipality of the parent 
firm, and 0 otherwise.  
Finally, the parent firm characteristics vector includes the following 
variables: ln(PAge), which is the logarithm of the number of years of the 
parent firm since creation until the year of start-up’s foundation; ln(PSize), 
which is the logarithm of the parent firm’s number of employees in 2006; and 
performance, measured as a dummy variable equaling 1 if the parent firm 
performed better than similar firms in the same industry and region and 0 
otherwise. Performance is evaluated as the ratio of net profit (“Resultado 
Líquido do Exercício”) divided by total sales.  
Accordingly with our theory, we expect that β1 and β2 to be both positive 
and statistic significant, meaning that the independent variables MKTm and 
R&𝐷m  (market and technological knowledge, respectively) have a positive 
impact on Yfsm (start-up’s survival). The estimated results are presented in 
Table 3 using OLS.  Column (a) presents the results for survival including the 
characteristics of the founder and of the start-up, in column (b) we include 
the characteristics of the parent firm, in column (c) we include our variable of 
interest Market knowledge, in column (d) we include an interaction variable 
Market*Pindex, in column (e) we exclude the variables Market knowledge 
and Market*Pindex and include our second variable of interest Technological 
Knowledge, in column (f) we include to the previous regression an interaction 
variable Technical*Pindex, in column (h) we include all variables excluding 
the interaction variables (column (h) corresponds to our key regression (1)), 
and finally in column (f) we include the interaction variables. 






As we can see from column (b), in general the probability of new firms’ 
survival increases by 4,77% for founders with the same regional experience 
as the parent firm, 8,12% for highly educated founders, 5,29% if the founder 
is a men, and decreases for founders with entrepreneurial experience by 
12,8%. Also, we observe that the higher is the initial number of employees of 
the start-ups, the higher is their probability of survival by 4,35%. All of the 
previous variables mentioned before shows a statistical significance at 1%. 
We can also infer from the results in column (b) that a parent firm older 
increases the probability of start-up survival by 2,27% while the size of the 
parent firm decreases their chances of survival. The parent firm’s 
performance appears not being statistical significant and, in this sense, their 
impact on new firms’ survival is insignificant. 
Column (h) shows that both variables of interest are positive, nevertheless 
the coefficients are not statistical significant. These results suggest that 
founders that previous worked in parent firms with high levels of R&D and 
marketing expenses do not affect the survival prospects of new start-ups. 
That is, the impact of market and technological knowledge on new firms’ 
survival appears not being significant.  
In order to test the impact of knowledge accumulation on spin-offs 
relatively to non-spin-offs firms, we computed two interaction variables 
namely Market*Pindex and Technical*Pindex, where Pindex=1 means that 
the start-up is a spin-off and Pindex=0 is a non-spin-off firm. As we can notice 
from column (i), where we added the two interaction variables to our key 
regression (1), Technical*Pindex variable are statistical significant at 5% 






showing that the higher is the percentage of people assigned in R&D over the 
total number of employees in the spin-off’s parent firm, the more is the 
knowledge that founders can learn and transfer and, in this sense, the longer 
spin-offs can survive. In other words, a spin-off that comes from a parent firm 
that employs an average of more individuals allocated to R&D increases their 
survival prospects by 8,13%. 
In the other hand, the variable Market*Pindex is not statistical significant 
meaning that market knowledge does not have a significant impact on spin-
off’s survival. This result contradicts our second and third hypotheses where 
we argued that the impact of market knowledge on spin-offs’ performance is 
higher than the impact of technological knowledge. With these results we 
conclude that only technological knowledge has a significant impact on spin-
offs’ performance in terms of survival. 
 
Growth 
Next, we evaluate the effect of knowledge on spin-offs’ growth as an 
alternative measure of performance, by using our key regression (1). In this 
case the dependent variable  Yfsm  denotes start-ups’ growth (employment 
growth rate) for firms that survived until 2009. This variable is the logarithm 
difference between the number of employees in 2009 and the initial number 
of employees. That is, this variable indicates the employment growth rate of 
start-ups from 2007 to 2009.  
The estimated results on new venture growth are presented in Table 4 
using OLS. Column (a) presents the results for growth including the 






characteristics of the founder and of the start-up, in column (b) we include 
the characteristics of the parent firm, in column (c) we include our variable of 
interest Market knowledge, in column (d) we include an interaction variable 
Market*Pindex, in column (e) we exclude the variables Market Knowledge 
and Market*Pindex and include our second variable of interest Technological 
Knowledge, in column (f) we include to regression in column (e) an interaction 
variable Technical*Pindex, in column (h) we include all variables excluding 
the interaction variables (column (h) corresponds to our key regression (1)), 
and finally column (f) includes the interaction variables. 
We can observe from column (a), that the variables Age 30-39 and Age 40-
49 are statistical significant at 10%, meaning that founders with ages 
between 30 and 49 years old have a significant and positive impact in start-
ups’ employment growth rate by 4,45% and 4,53%, respectively. Also, we can 
notice that in general new venture growth increases by 9,99% for founders 
with industry experience and decreases by 7,62% for founders with 
entrepreneurial experience.  
From column (b) we can infer that the parent firm’s size is statistical 
significant at 1% increasing start-up’s growth by 1,75%. The other 
characteristics of parent firms, age and performance, do not have an impact 
on start-up’s employment growth rate. 
As we can see from column (h), none of the variables of interest (market 
and technological knowledge) affect start-up’s employment growth rate. From 
column (i), where we introduce the interaction variables Market*Pindex and 
Technical*Pindex, we observe that the while Market knowledge does not have 






a significant impact on spin-offs’ growth, Technical Knowledge is statistical 
significant at 10%. We can infer from the results that a spin-off that comes 
from a parent firm that employs an average of more individuals allocated to 
R&D increases their growth by 10,5% (both columns (f) or (i) presents the 
same result). 
Once more, in opposite of what we were expecting, market knowledge does 

















VI. CONCLUSION  







This paper uses Portuguese micro-level data on firms and founders to 
analyze the effect of knowledge accumulation/transfer on spin-offs’ 
performance. We draw on two rich datasets: matched employer-employee 
database (Quadros de Pessoal) and a financial database (SCIE). This datasets 
give us detailed information on founders, their background history, parent 
firm’s R&D investments and marketing expenses. With such comprehensive 
information, we evaluate what knowledge is more likely to affect spin-off’s 
performance and what founder characteristics and parent firm 
characteristics affect new ventures performance. We measured spin-offs’ 
performance in terms of survival and growth (employment growth rate). 
However, the results of our research contradict in some points our 
hypothesis. We can conclude from our results that only technological 
knowledge learned and transferred by founders from parent firms has a 
significant impact on the performance of spin-offs in terms of survival and 
growth. This finding strongly refutes our third hypothesis where we argued 
that market knowledge has a higher impact on spin-off’s performance than 
technological knowledge in the short-term.  
The findings of our research have significant implications for policy-
makers and academics. This is important for policy makers, who wish to 
enhance entrepreneurial activity and for researchers to understand which 
knowledge promotes successful ventures. A policy designed to foster high-
quality new ventures should comprise parent firms. They are important 
sources of new high-quality firms, and our results point in the direction that 






an environment conducive for investments in R&D in established firms has a 
higher potential for generating such high-quality entrepreneurs in the form 
of spin-offs from parent firms. 
This study comes with some limitations. It was difficult to measure the 
different types of knowledge and to find good proxies that truly represent 
which the two kinds of knowledge. We used the best measures available in 
our data. Since our results contradict in some points our theory, we believe 
that we should compute more adequate variables in order to realize this 
analysis. 
The second limitation of our study comes from our sample. We also believe 
that our results it wasn’t completely what we were expecting since we have a 
reduced number of new firms in our sample, not allowing us to perform 
consistent measures. 
Future research should test the impact of organizational knowledge on 
spin-offs’ performance. Since parents’ organizational routines, blueprints, 
strategies and organizational forms are also transferred to the new firms. It 
would be good to know in what extent this kind of knowledge creates an 
advantageous position for spin-offs over the other start-ups and if this 
knowledge has or not a bigger impact on spin-offs performance relatively to 
market and technological knowledge.  
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Tabela 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note: The table reports some descriptive statistics for our variables. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Obs. Mean Std Dev. Obs. Mean Std Dev.
Panel A - Start-up  characteristics
Size 10086 3,43 6,65 2193 4,60 8,94 6879 3,18 6,15
Survival 10086 0,76 0,42 2193 0,80 0,40 6879 0,80 0,40
Growth 10086 0,11 0,66 2193 0,15 0,66 6879 0,10 0,66
Panel B - Founder characteristics
Age 20-29 10086 0,35 0,48 2193 0,30 0,46 6879 0,36 0,48
Age 30-39 10086 0,37 0,48 2193 0,41 0,49 6879 0,37 0,48
Age 40-49 10086 0,20 0,40 2193 0,22 0,41 6879 0,19 0,39
Age 50-60 10086 0,09 0,28 2193 0,08 0,27 6879 0,08 0,28
Very Low Education 10020 0,11 0,32 2187 0,17 0,38 6846 0,09 0,29
Low Education 10020 0,36 0,48 2187 0,48 0,50 6846 0,34 0,47
Medium Education 10020 0,30 0,46 2187 0,24 0,42 6846 0,32 0,47
High Education 10020 0,22 0,42 2187 0,12 0,32 6846 0,25 0,43
Gender (Men) 10086 0,66 0,47 2193 0,71 0,46 6879 0,65 0,48
Pindex 9072 0,24 0,43 2193 1 0 6879 0 0
Regional experience 9072 0,43 0,50 2193 0,71 0,45 6879 0,34 0,47
Entrepreneurial experience 9072 0,63 0,48 2193 0,63 0,48 6879 0,63 0,48
Panel C - Parent firm characteristics
PAge 6120 15,82 19,24 2193 11,05 11,13 4076 18,39 22
PSize 6269 209,4 1129,8 2193 25,24 196,94 4076 308,44 1383,6
Performance 4918 0,81 0,40 1615 0,85 0,36 3303 0,78 0,41
Variables of interest
Maket knowledge 4918 0,17 0,37 1615 0,13 0,34 3303 0,19 0,39
Technological knowledge 5007 0,16 0,36 1642 0,20 0,40 3365 0,14 0,35
Spin-offs                                
(Pindex=1)
Non Sin-offs                                 
(Pindex=0)
Sample                                
(All start-ups)






Tabela 2: Variables Description 
 
Variable Description
Size Size  is the start-up's initial number of employees, that is, the total number of individuals in the employee records in the foundation year (2007).
Survival Survival is na indicator variable equaling 1 for start-ups that survived their first 3 years (since foundation year – 2007 – until 2009) and 0 otherwise. Firms are
classified as non-survivors if they do not appear in the database in following years.
Growth This varable denotes the employment growth rate from 2007 to 2009 for start-ups that survived until 2009. This variable is computed as the logarithm difference
between the number of employees in 2009 and the initial number of employees (in 2007). 
Age This variable is coded in years in the database. We define four categorical variables: Age 20-29 is coded one for individuals with age between 20 and 29; Age 30-39 is
coded one for individuals with age between 30 and 39; Age 40-49  is coded one for individuals with age between 40 and 49; Age 50-60  is coded one for individuals with age 
between 50 and 60.
Education This variable is measured with four categorical variables: high education is a dummy variable equaling one for founders with bachelors, masters or doctoral degrees;
medium education is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals reporting a high school diploma or vocational school degree; low education is a dummy variable
equaling one for individuals that attended junior high school; and very low education is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals who never attended or
completed the elementary school.
Gender (Men) Gender  is a dummy variable equaling 1 for men and 0 for women.
Industry experience Industry experience (Pindex ) is an indicator variable equaling 1 for founders that have previously work on the same four-digit industry code and 0 otherwise. In other
words, this variable equals 1 if the new firm is a spin-off and 0 otherwise.
Regional experience Regional is a variable that indicates if the start-up locates near to the parent firm. Equals 1 for spin-offs which locates on the same region (municipality) of the parent
firm, and 0 otherwise.
Entrepreneurial experience This variable equals 1 if a founder have created a start-up in a given year previous to 2007 and 0 if not. We can distinguish two categories of entrepreneurs: “novice
entrepreneurs”, who have not previously established a firm, but who do have previous labor experience, and “habitual entrepreneurs”, who have both previous
entrepreneurial and labor experience.
PAge This variable denotes the age of the parent firm.  This variable is computed the total number of years of the parent firm since creation until 2006.
PSize This variable indicates the parent firm's size. The variable is computed as the the total number of employees in 2006 (the previous year of start-up's foundation).
Performance This variable equals 1 if the parent firm has a higher performance ratio than the average per region and industry and 0 otherwise. This performance ratio consists in
the net profit of the year ("Resultado Líquido do Exercício") divided by sales in 2006.
Technical knowledge This variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a given parent firm has, in 2006, a percentage of employees assigned to R&D over the total number of employees in the
company more or equal than an average of this percentage per industry and region, and 0 otherwise.  
Maket knowledge We define this variable as the marketing expenses (in advertising, promotions, expenditures on sales, etc) of the parent firm in 2006 (previous year of spin-off's creation).
To compute this variable, we divide marketing expenses by sales in order to exclude the effect of the parent firm size. Next, we simply compute an average by region and
industry of marketing expenses of all parent firms in our sample in 2006. If a parent firm has conducted market expenses above or equals this average, the variable
equals 1, if not equals 0.
Panel B - Founder characteristics
Panel A - Start-up characteristics
Panel C - Parent firm characteristics
Variables of interest





Tabela 3: Correlations 
 
 
Note: The table presents the correlations between our variables. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Panel A
1 Size 1
2 Survival 0.0534 1
3 Growth -0.3677 0.1194 1
Panel B
4 Age 20-29 -0.0184 -0.0518 -0.0096 1
5 Age 30-39 0.0117 0.0284 0.0029 -0.5759 1
6 Age 40-49 0.0028 0.0252 0.0081 -0.3444 -0.4121 1
7 Age 50-60 0.0070 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.1895 -0.2267 -0.1356 1
8 Very Low Education 0.0828 -0.0137 0.0160 -0.1559 -0.0628 0.1282 0.2077 1
9 Low Education 0.0686 0.0001 -0.0093 0.0168 -0.0366 0.0294 -0.0062 -0.2833 1
10 Medium Education -0.0577 -0.0215 -0.0224 0.1155 -0.0278 -0.0461 -0.0867 -0.2332 -0.5315 1
11 High Education -0.0834 0.0358 0.0249 -0.0316 0.1277 -0.0845 -0.0563 -0.1723 -0.3927 -0.3233 1
12 Gender (Men) 0.0675 0.0372 0.0005 0.0021 -0.0226 0.0143 0.0173 0.0579 0.0896 -0.0449 -0.1045 1
13 Pindex 0.1750 0.0289 0.0243 -0.0473 0.0037 0.0444 0.0106 0.1079 0.1078 -0.0971 -0.1060 0.0560 1
14 Regional experience 0.0874 0.0632 -0.0095 -0.0585 -0.0073 0.0454 0.0509 0.0729 0.1096 -0.0802 -0.1000 -0.0134 0.1171 1
15 Entrepreneurial experience 0.0139 -0.1389 -0.0566 -0.0116 -0.0092 0.0216 0.0053 0.0021 0.0208 -0.0038 -0.0230 0.0395 0.0324 0.0552 1
Panel C 
16 PAge -0.0802 -0.0149 0.0017 -0.0275 -0.0255 0.0443 0.0304 -0.0237 -0.0435 0.0225 0.0464 -0.0166 -0.1990 -0.1421 -0.0252 1
17 PSize -0.0611 -0.0514 -0.0096 0.0702 -0.0344 -0.0206 -0.0305 -0.0323 -0.0358 0.0505 0.0111 -0.0487 -0.1192 -0.1407 -0.0030 0.3238 1
18 Performance 0.0665 -0.0111 0.0039 0.0168 0.0164 -0.0235 -0.0257 0.0321 0.0523 -0.0473 -0.0351 0.0435 0.0800 0.0250 -0.0046 0.0467 0.0743 1
Variables of interest
20 Maket knowledge -0.0398 0.0008 -0.0050 0.0375 -0.0137 -0.0089 -0.0287 -0.0701 -0.0317 0.0595 0.0256 -0.0418 -0.0673 -0.0507 -0.0282 0.1056 0.0618 -0.0305 1
19 Technological knowledge 0.0220 -0.0025 -0.0174 -0.0109 -0.0084 0.0199 0.0051 0.0580 0.0329 -0.0088 -0.0766 0.0229 0.0734 0.0562 -0.0175 0.0242 0.0113 0.0654 -0.0122 1









Note: The table reports estimated coefficients for our key equation (1) present in column (h), 
and for other regressions. The dependent variable is three year survival (1 if the start-up 
survived, 0 if not). County and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. The 
variables Age 50-60 and Very Low Education are the omitted variables. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is presented below. *** denotes 




Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (h) (i)
Panel A
ln(Size) 0.0341*** 0.0435*** 0.0436*** 0.0436*** 0.0435*** 0.0434*** 0.0436*** 0.0436***
(0.00624) (0.00852) (0.00852) (0.00852) (0.00852) (0.00853) (0.00852) (0.00853)
Panel B
Age 20-29 -0.0545*** -0.0191 -0.0193 -0.0191 -0.0190 -0.0190 -0.0193 -0.0191
(0.0171) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0275)
Age 30-39 -0.0203 0.0182 0.0181 0.0182 0.0181 0.0186 0.0180 0.0186
(0.0167) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Age 40-49 -0.00827 0.0304 0.0302 0.0301 0.0304 0.0302 0.0301 0.0299
(0.0174) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0276)
Low Education 0.00464 0.0337 0.0331 0.0333 0.0339 0.0334 0.0332 0.0329
(0.0153) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)
Medium Education 0.0132 0.0386 0.0375 0.0378 0.0388 0.0393* 0.0376 0.0385
(0.0164) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238)
High Education 0.0491*** 0.0812*** 0.0801*** 0.0803*** 0.0815*** 0.0816*** 0.0804*** 0.0806***
(0.0183) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Gender (Men) 0.0322*** 0.0529*** 0.0530*** 0.0533*** 0.0528*** 0.0529*** 0.0529*** 0.0532***
(0.00973) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147)
Pindex 0.00739 0.0163 0.0164 0.0205 0.0159 0.00304 0.0161 0.00710
(0.0111) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0165)
Regional experience -0.000654 0.0477*** 0.0477*** 0.0473*** 0.0475*** 0.0486*** 0.0475*** 0.0482***
(0.00972) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142)
Entrepreneurial experience -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128***
(0.00845) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Panel C 
ln(PAge) 0.0227*** 0.0228*** 0.0225*** 0.0228*** 0.0234*** 0.0228*** 0.0231***
(0.00735) (0.00735) (0.00737) (0.00736) (0.00736) (0.00735) (0.00738)
ln(PSize) -0.0188*** -0.0192*** -0.0192*** -0.0189*** -0.0189*** -0.0192*** -0.0193***
(0.00435) (0.00438) (0.00438) (0.00436) (0.00436) (0.00439) (0.00438)
Performance 0.000986 0.00132 0.00146 0.000619 0.000543 0.000949 0.00102
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Variables of interest
Market knowledge 0.0127 0.0202 0.0127 0.0202
(0.0171) (0.0198) (0.0171) (0.0198)
Market*Pindex -0.0284 -0.0270
(0.0387) (0.0385)
Technological knowledge 0.00847 -0.0210 0.00862 -0.0210
(0.0217) (0.0262) (0.0217) (0.0262)
Technical*Pindex 0.0814** 0.0813**
(0.0363) (0.0363)
Constant 0.911*** 1.245*** 1.236*** 1.231*** 1.248*** 1.225*** 1.239*** 1.212***
(0.0703) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310) (0.307) (0.311) (0.308)
Observations 9033 4809 4809 4809 4809 4809 4809 4809
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.057











Note: The table reports estimated coefficients for our key equation (1) present in column (h), 
and for other regressions. The dependent variable is the employment growth rate of start-ups 
from 2007 to 2009. County and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. The 
variables Age 50-60 and Very Low Education are the omitted variables. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses and the number of observations is presented below. *** denotes statistical 
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. 
 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (h) (i)
Panel A
ln(Size) -0.382*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.395***
(0.0142) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200)
Panel B
Age 20-29 0.0218 -0.0336 -0.0333 -0.0335 -0.0336 -0.0336 -0.0333 -0.0335
(0.0260) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0424)
Age 30-39 0.0445* -0.00560 -0.00550 -0.00555 -0.00566 -0.00503 -0.00556 -0.00499
(0.0256) (0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0411)
Age 40-49 0.0453* 0.00839 0.00871 0.00878 0.00835 0.00818 0.00867 0.00857
(0.0267) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0426)
Low Education -0.0221 -0.0490 -0.0481 -0.0483 -0.0489 -0.0495 -0.0480 -0.0488
(0.0226) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332)
Medium Education -0.0159 -0.0432 -0.0416 -0.0419 -0.0431 -0.0423 -0.0415 -0.0411
(0.0250) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0368) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0368)
High Education 0.0217 0.00414 0.00569 0.00555 0.00438 0.00452 0.00591 0.00588
(0.0284) (0.0419) (0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0420) (0.0420)
Gender (Men) 0.0213 0.0175 0.0174 0.0171 0.0173 0.0175 0.0172 0.0172
(0.0144) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217)
Pindex 0.0999*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.102***
(0.0172) (0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0254) (0.0234) (0.0245) (0.0234) (0.0263)
Regional experience 0.0190 0.0301 0.0301 0.0305 0.0299 0.0314 0.0299 0.0318
(0.0145) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0211)
Entrepreneurial experience -0.0762*** -0.0898*** -0.0901*** -0.0899*** -0.0897*** -0.0891*** -0.0900*** -0.0892***
(0.0140) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Panel C 
ln(PAge) -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0166 -0.0168 -0.0160 -0.0168 -0.0158
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109)
ln(PSize) 0.0175*** 0.0179*** 0.0180*** 0.0174*** 0.0175*** 0.0179*** 0.0180***
(0.00627) (0.00633) (0.00633) (0.00626) (0.00626) (0.00632) (0.00632)
Performance 0.0136 0.0132 0.0130 0.0133 0.0132 0.0128 0.0126
(0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239)
Variables of interest
Market knowledge -0.0179 -0.0252 -0.0178 -0.0252
(0.0248) (0.0285) (0.0248) (0.0285)
Market*Pindex 0.0273 0.0291
(0.0569) (0.0569)
Technological knowledge 0.00784 -0.0302 0.00763 -0.0303
(0.0346) (0.0373) (0.0346) (0.0373)
Technical*Pindex 0.105* 0.105*
(0.0574) (0.0574)
Constant -1.522*** 0.197 0.209 0.214 0.200 0.170 0.212 0.187
(0.452) (0.378) (0.379) (0.380) (0.378) (0.377) (0.380) (0.379)
Observations 9033 4809 4809 4809 4809 4809 4809 4809
Adjusted R-squared 0.187 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181








A.1 ALTERNATIVE VARIABLE FOR TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
The alternative variable for technological knowledge consists in the R&D 
investments of the parent firm in 2006 (includes expenses on research and 
development and industrial property), divided by sales. We divide R&D 
investments by sales in order to exclude the effect of the parent firm size. 
Then, we compute an average of R&D investments per region and industry of 
all parent firms in our sample. If a given parent firm have invested more or a 
value equal to this average in 2006, the variable equals 1, if not equals 0. 
As we can notice from Tables 6 and 7, using this alternative variable for 
technological knowledge leading us to conclude that technological knowledge 
do not have impact on spin-offs’s performance both in terms of survival and 















Tabela 6: The impact of knowledge on Spin-offs' Survival
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients for our key equation (1) and other regressions, but 
using an alternative measure for technological knowledge. The dependent variable is three year 
survival (1 if the start-up survived, 0 if not). County and industry fixed effects are included but 
not reported. The variables Age 50-60 and Very Low Education are the omitted variables. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is presented below. *** 
denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Panel A
ln(Size) 0.0436*** 0.0435*** 0.0438*** 0.0437***
(0.00852) (0.00852) (0.00852) (0.00852)
Panel B
Age 20-29 -0.0185 -0.0184 -0.0188 -0.0185
(0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0276)
Age 30-39 0.0187 0.0188 0.0186 0.0187
(0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Age 40-49 0.0305 0.0306 0.0303 0.0303
(0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0277)
Low Education 0.0340 0.0340 0.0334 0.0336
(0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223)
Medium Education 0.0387 0.0386 0.0376 0.0378
(0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0238)
High Education 0.0807*** 0.0809*** 0.0797*** 0.0800***
(0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Gender (Men) 0.0528*** 0.0528*** 0.0529*** 0.0532***
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147)
Pindex 0.0165 0.0179 0.0166 0.0219
(0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0155)
Regional experience 0.0475*** 0.0473*** 0.0475*** 0.0469***
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142)
Entrepreneurial experience -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128***
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Panel C 
ln(PAge) 0.0229*** 0.0229*** 0.0230*** 0.0227***
(0.00736) (0.00737) (0.00736) (0.00739)
ln(PSize) -0.0191*** -0.0192*** -0.0194*** -0.0195***
(0.00438) (0.00438) (0.00441) (0.00440)
Performance 0.000751 0.000805 0.00108 0.00127
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Variables of interest




Technological knowledge 0.0233 0.0320 0.0224 0.0300
(0.0302) (0.0331) (0.0303) (0.0331)
Technical*Pindex -0.0431 -0.0402
(0.0795) (0.0797)
Constant 1.244*** 1.244*** 1.236*** 1.231***
(0.310) (0.310) (0.311) (0.311)
Observations 4809 4809 4809 4809
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.056






Tabela 7: The impact of knowledge on Spin-offs' Growth 
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients for our key equation (1) and other regressions, but using 
the alternative measure for technological knowledge. The dependent variable is the employment growth 
rate of start-ups from 2007 to 2009. County and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. The 
variables Age 50-60 and Very Low Education are the omitted variables. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses and the number of observations is presented below. *** denotes statistical significance at 
1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Panel A
ln(Size) -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.395***
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200)
Panel B
Age 20-29 -0.0341 -0.0344 -0.0338 -0.0342
(0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0425)
Age 30-39 -0.00601 -0.00624 -0.00589 -0.00614
(0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0412)
Age 40-49 0.00829 0.00816 0.00861 0.00855
(0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0426)
Low Education -0.0492 -0.0493 -0.0483 -0.0486
(0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0333)
Medium Education -0.0433 -0.0431 -0.0417 -0.0419
(0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0368)
High Education 0.00458 0.00423 0.00606 0.00555
(0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0421)
Gender (Men) 0.0176 0.0175 0.0175 0.0172
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217)
Pindex 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.123*** 0.117***
(0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0236) (0.0256)
Regional experience 0.0302 0.0306 0.0302 0.0310
(0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0211)
Entrepreneurial experience -0.0900*** -0.0901*** -0.0903*** -0.0902***
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Panel C 
ln(PAge) -0.0169 -0.0169 -0.0170 -0.0167
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109)
ln(PSize) 0.0177*** 0.0178*** 0.0182*** 0.0183***
(0.00630) (0.00630) (0.00635) (0.00635)
Performance 0.0138 0.0137 0.0134 0.0131
(0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0238)
Variables of interest




Technological knowledge -0.0196 -0.0353 -0.0183 -0.0328
(0.0466) (0.0520) (0.0467) (0.0523)
Technical*Pindex 0.0785 0.0750
(0.115) (0.116)
Constant 0.198 0.198 0.209 0.214
(0.377) (0.377) (0.379) (0.379)
Observations 4809 4809 4809 4809
Adjusted R-squared 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.180
